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Abstract
According to the well-known “merger paradox”, in a Cournot market game
mergers are generally unprofitable unless most firms merge. The present paper
proposes an optimal merger mechanism. With this mechanism mergers are never
unprofitable, more profitable than in other known mechanism, and in many
cases welfare increasing. The proposed mechanism assumes that merged firms
continue to operate as independent subsidiaries that are rewarded according to a
simple and commonly observed relative performance measure.
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1 Introduction
According to the well-known “merger paradox”, in a Cournot market game mergers
are generally unprofitable unless almost all firms merge. In fact, if firms are symmetric
and demand and cost functions are linear, it has been claimed that a merger can only
be profitable if at least 80% of all firms merge (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds,
1983).1
While this finding has been welcomed by some as an explanation of the fact that the
majority of mergers leads to losses and ends up in “divorce”,2 economists generally
find it hard to believe that firms engage in activities that are predictably unprofitable.
∗We would like to thank Byoung Heon Jun for detailed comments. Research support by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant: 71371116) and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(DFG), SFB Transregio 15, “Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems”, is gratefully acknowl-
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1In the linear model, 80% is sufficient if the number of firms is equal to 5 and the required percentage
is even higher for all n 6= 5. If one replaces linear by concave inverse demand, that percentage becomes
smaller, but not smaller than 50% (see Faulí-Oller, 1997).
2See, for example, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989); Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001).
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The subsequent literature mitigated the merger paradox, and emphasized that mergers
may be profitable if firms are sufficiently different, cost functions are sufficiently
convex, mergers are subject to significant synergies or Cournot is replaced by Bertrand
competition.3
An important change in perspective was introduced by Creane and Davidson (2004)
and Huck, Konrad, and Müller (2004). They emphasized that merged firms typically
become independently managed subsidiaries of a holding company. Mergers facilitate
the information exchange between subsidiaries which in turn can be used for “... setting
up an internal game in which the divisions compete against one another”(Creane and
Davidson, 2004, p. 953). Both papers propose a particular mechanism in which the
merged firm “staggers” the output decisions and instructs its subsidiaries to move
sequentially. That mechanism improves the profitability of mergers, although it neither
assures that all mergers are profitable nor does it realize all possible gains from merger.
The present paper proposes a more profitable merger mechanism that assures that
mergers are never unprofitable. That mechanism induces the subsidiaries of the
merged firm to choose an output profile that cannot be improved while satisfying the
conditions for an equilibrium of the simultaneous moves game between the merged
and the non-merged firms. Therefore, the proposed mechanism is optimal.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 motivates the analysis with a linear example,
assuming bilateral mergers. Section 3 proves the optimality of the proposed mecha-
nism in a general framework, allowing for mergers of arbitrary size, nonlinear demand,
and nonlinear cost functions. Section 4 addresses the commitment problem and shows
that the proposed mechanism can also be interpreted as the result of an exchange of
non-voting shares between the owners of the firms that merge.
2 Motivating example
Consider a simple Cournot oligopoly with n≥ 3 identical firms, linear inverse demand
and linear cost, with unit cost normalized to zero. Denote firms’ outputs by qi, inverse
demand by P(Q) := 1−Q,Q := ∑i qi, and firms’ payoff functions by πi(qi,q−i) :=
P(Q)qi.
Suppose two firms merge, say firms 1 and 2.
If the merger is in the form of a “fusion” ( f ), as is implicitly assumed in the “merger
paradox”, the two firms are completely absorbed in the merged firm that maximizes
its profit. In that case the merger reduces the number of firms from n to n− 1 and
the merged firm is simply one of n−1 firms that play a simultaneous moves Cournot
market game. Firms’ equilibrium strategies and profits before and after the merger
are q0 = 1/(n+1),π0 = 1/(n+1)2, respectively q f = 1/n,π f = 1/n2. The gain for those who
merge is equal to G f := π f − 2π0 = (1−n(n−2))/(n2(n+1)2) < 0. Hence, the merger is
unprofitable for those who merge and benefits only those who do not merge.
3For the impact of asymmetries and synergies, convex cost functions, and the assumed market game
see Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Ding, Fan, and Wolfstetter (2013), Perry and Porter (1985), and
Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
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As an alternative to fusions, we propose the following merger mechanism: 1) The two
firms that merge continue to operate as independent subsidiaries. 2) The headquarter
of the merged firm rewards the managers of the subsidiaries according to their relative
performance. Each manager is paid the salary:
Si := πi−απ j− t, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1,2} (1)
where t is a lump-sum “tax”, and α, t are set optimally to maximize the headquarter’s
profit. That reward scheme is made known to all firms. 3) After the merger the
subsidiaries 1 and 2 and the n− 2 non-merged firms 3, . . . ,n play a simultaneous
moves Cournot market game. Note that such a reward scheme is not accessible to
non-merged firms, because they cannot observe each other’s profits.
This mechanism implements the outcome of a hypothetical Stackelberg game in which
the merged firm is a multi-plant Stackelberg leader who operates two plants and
chooses a uniform output per plant, qL, and the n−2 non-merged firms are followers
who choose their outputs, qF , simultaneously, after having observed the leader’s output
per plant, qL.
The equilibrium of that hypothetical Stackelberg game is (q∗L,qF(qL))= (1/4, (1−2qL)/(n−1)),
which leads to the equilibrium output profile
(q∗L,qF(q
∗
L)) =
(
1
4
,
1
2(n−1)
)
. (2)
Now consider the proposed mechanism for given (α, t). As a working hypothesis,
suppose the equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that each subsidiary plays the
strategy qM and each non-merged firm plays qN . The equilibrium must solve the
following requirements:
qM = argmax
q
(1−q−qM− (n−2)qN)(q−αqM)− t
qN = argmax
q
(1−2qM−q− (n−3)qN)q,
which yields the equilibrium solution as a function of α: qM(α) = 1/(n+1−(n−1)α),
qN(α) = (1−α)/(n+1−(n−1)α).
The headquarter sets (α, t) to maximize its profit. This is achieved by setting
α
∗ =
n−3
n−1
, t∗ =
1
4(n−1)2
, (3)
because this induces the same equilibrium outputs as the hypothetical Stackelberg
equilibrium,
qM(α∗) = q∗L, qN(α
∗) = qF(q∗L), (4)
and allows the headquarter to extract the entire profits of the subsidiaries:4
Obviously, this mechanism induces the most profitable equilibrium output profile of
the subsidiaries, and hence is optimal.
4The choice of t assumes, for simplicity, that managers’ opportunity cost is equal to zero.
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The resulting gain from merger, G, is equal to
G := (1−2qM(α∗)− (n−2)qN(α∗))2qM(α∗)−2π0 =
(n−3)2
4(n2−1)(n+1)
. (5)
G is positive for all n > 3 and equal to zero for n = 3. Hence the merger is never
unprofitable and profitable for all n > 3, and non-merged firms are never better-off
and worse-off for all n≥ 4.
Moreover, the merger changes the equilibrium aggregate output from Q0 = n/(n+1) to
Q = 1− 1/2(n−1) which implies Q−Q0 = (n−3)/2(n2−1). Therefore, the merger never
reduces welfare and increases it whenever the merger is profitable.
Finally, we compare the profitability of the proposed mechanism with that of the
“staggered competition” mechanism by Creane and Davidson (2004) and Huck, Konrad,
and Müller (2004), where the subsidiaries are instructed to move sequentially. There,
one subsidiary moves first and informs the other, but not the n−2 non-merged firms,
of its output choice.
If this mechanism (indicated by the subscript s) is employed, the gain from merger is
equal to
Gs =
n(n−2)−5
(n+1)2(n+2)2
. (6)
Gs is negative for n = 3, yet positive for all n≥ 4.
This mechanism is far less profitable than the proposed mechanism. Indeed,
G−Gs =
(n−4)2
4(n−1)(n+2)2
, (7)
is non-negative, positive for all n 6= 4, and strictly increasing in n for all n > 4. For
n = 8, switching from “staggered competition” to the proposed mechanism already
more than doubles the profitability of the merger.
One reason why the “staggered competition” mechanism is less profitable, and even
entails losses if n = 3, is that it induces the first mover to raise its profit at the expense
of the second mover.
3 Generalization
We now generalize and allow for mergers of arbitrary size, nonlinear inverse de-
mand, P(Q), and non-linear cost functions, C(q). We assume that P and C are twice
continuously differentiable, with P′(Q)< 0,C′(q)> 0, and P
′′
(Q)≤ 0, C′′(q)≥ 0.
Consider mergers of k+1 firms, where k ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1}. This allows for mergers
of all possible sizes, ranging from the merger of two firms (k = 1) to the merger of
all firms (k = n−1). The number k indicates how many independent firms leave the
market due to the merger and either vanish as independent firms (in the case of a
fusion) or continue to operate as subsidiaries of the merged firm. The manager of
each subsidiary i is paid a salary equal to Si := πi−απ̄−i− t, where π̄−i denotes the
average profit of all subsidiaries other than subsidiary i.
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To prepare our general result, we first state some properties of the hypothetical
Stackelberg game in which one firm is a “multi-plant” Stackelberg leader who operates
k+ 1 plants and chooses a uniform output per plant, qL, and (n− k− 1) firms are
followers who simultaneously choose their outputs, qF , after having observed the
leader’s output per plant, qL. The equilibrium strategies of that hypothetical game,
(q∗L,qF(qL)), must satisfy the following equilibrium requirements:
qF = argmax
q
P
(
(k+1)qL +q+(n− k−2)qF
)
q−C(q), ∀qL
q∗L = argmaxq
P
(
(k+1)q+(n− k−1)qF(q)
)
q−C(q).
Therefore, (q∗L,qF(qL)) solves the conditions:
P(Q)−C′(qF(qL))+P′(Q)qF(qL) = 0, ∀qL (8)
P(Q∗)−C′(q∗L)+P′(Q∗)q∗L
(
k+1+(n− k−1)q′F(q∗L)
)
= 0 (9)
Q = (k+1)qL +(n− k−1)qF(qL), Q∗ = (k+1)q∗L +(n− k−1)qF(q∗L). (10)
Now return to the proposed mechanism and denote the equilibrium outputs of the k+1
subsidiaries of the merged firm by qM and the equilibrium outputs of the non-merged
firms by qN . We find:
Proposition 1. The proposed mechanism with optimally chosen (α∗, t∗) implements
the equilibrium outcome of the above hypothetical Stackelberg game, i.e.,
qM = q∗L, qN = qF(q
∗
L). (11)
Therefore, the merged firm earns the same equilibrium profit as the leader in that hy-
pothetical Stackelberg game. Mergers are generally profitable and never unprofitable.
Proof. For given (α, t), the equilibrium outputs, (qM,qN), must satisfy the following
equilibrium requirements:
qM = argmax
q
P
(
q+ kqM +(n− k−1)qN
)
(q−αqM)−C(q)+αC(qM)− t
qN = argmax
q
P
(
(k+1)qM +q+(n− k−2)qN
)
q−C(q).
Therefore, (qM,qN) solve the conditions:
P(Q)−C′(qM)+P′(Q)(1−α)qM = 0 (12)
P(Q)−C′(qN)+P′(Q)qN = 0 (13)
Q = (k+1)qM +(n− k−1)qN . (14)
Comparing conditions (13)-(14) with (8)-(10), we confirm that
(qM,qN) = (q∗L,qF(q
∗
L)) ⇐⇒ α = α∗ :=−(n− k−1)q′F(q∗L)− k, (15)
and the headquarter extracts the entire profit if and only if:5
t = t∗ :=
(
P(Q∗)q∗L−C(q∗L)
)
(1−α∗). (16)
5This choice of t assumes that the opportunity cost of managers is equal to zero.
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It follows that by setting (α, t) = (α∗, t∗) the merged firm earns the same profit as the
multi-plant Stackelberg leader in the hypothetical Stackelberg game.
The proposed mechanism is optimal because one cannot find a more profitable output
profile of the merged firm that satisfies the conditions for an equilibrium of the
simultaneous moves game between the subsidiaries and the non-merged firms.
We close with the special case of arbitrary size mergers in the linear model. There,
we find: α∗ = (n−2k−1)/(n−k), qM = 1/(2(k+1)), and qN = 1/(2(n−k)). Therefore, the gain
from merger of size k+1 is equal to:
G(k) =
(n−2k−1)2
4(n− k)(n+1)2
. (17)
G(k) is non-negative, strictly convex, and has a global minimum. Ignoring, for a
moment, that k must be an integer, the minimum is reached at k = (n−1)/2, which
represents the worst size merger. Therefore, every size merger is profitable if n is an
even number, whereas, if n is an odd number, the merger breaks even for k = (n−1)/2
and is profitable for all other k.
The merger also increases welfare (social surplus) if and only if k < (n−1)/2. This
follows from the fact that the merger changes the aggregate equilibrium output from
Q0 to Q = 1− 1/(2(n−k)) and Q−Q0 = (n−2k−1)/(2(n+1)(n−k)) T 0⇔ k S (n−1)/2. This
suggests that antitrust authorities should be permissive and prohibit only large mergers
that include more than half the number of firms.
4 Alternative interpretation
The proposed mechanism assumes delegation and requires the ability to commit to a
reward scheme for managers. However, it can also be interpreted as the result of an
exchange of non-voting shares among the original owners of the firms that merge.
In that interpretation the original owners of the firms that merge remain residual
claimants of the respective subsidiaries. For simplicity consider a merger of two firms.
The mechanism requires each of them to short-sell non-voting shares of the other firm
to each other. Specifically, firm i must short-sell shares in firm j to such an extent that
firm j acquires a contingent claim to βπ j in exchange for a fixed payment equal to
βπ∗j (where π
∗
j denotes j’s equilibrium profit).
As a result of this exchange of financial assets, the merged firms’ payoff function
becomes Πi = πi−β (π j−π∗j )+β (πi−π∗i ), i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1,2}. The maximizer of
Πi is the same as that of Πi/(1+β ) (as long as β 6=−1). Therefore, merged firms can
be viewed as maximizing πi−απ j− t, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1,2}, where t is a constant equal
to α(π∗i − π∗j ) = 0 and α := β/(1+β ). The only difference is that no delegation to
managers is used, the original owners of the subsidiaries maximize their profit, and
the headquarter enables the information exchange between the subsidiaries but does
not extract their profits.
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